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Michel Foucault and the Question of Rhetoric

Barbara Biesecker

Rhetorical Studies is a discipline animated by a profoundly utopian yearning. By and large, its practitioners operate out of the firm conviction that things can change, be otherwise, different—in fact better—provided that human beings intervene symbolically in a history that is of their own making. It is for this reason one may find it odd that rhetorical theorists and critics are beginning to turn to the work of Michel Foucault, a continental philosopher whose early and middle writings are understood by most readers to have made visible the ways in which "the subject of history is but the product of apparatuses of power/knowledge"[1] and whose later writings on an aesthetics of existence are taken by most American critics to have "elevated the quest for beauty in life over all the intellectual and moral virtues, with the result that the self rather than the world and its inhabitants becomes the central focus."[2] Given that Foucault's work appears to have undermined the liberal view of self-determination as the basis and condition of possibility for freedom, and seems to have flagrantly dismissed the deeply entrenched view of our discipline that the existing social order—its relations of exploitation, domination, and oppression— can be transcended through symbolic intervention and collective recognition and resistance, why have we welcomed him into the house that Aristotle built?

I am tempted to advance the proposition that Rhetoric has adopted Foucault because his work makes it possible for us to respond to a generalized pressure in the humanities to update or "postmodernize" our orthodoxies while preserving, in however veiled a fashion, our disciplinary identity. Feeling the wind of Cultural Studies in our face and the gnaw of Derridean post-structuralism at our heels, perhaps we have found in Foucault's theorizations and historical analyses a critical lexicon that, while establishing a crucial point of contact between us and others in the humanities, allows us nonetheless to continue to study the art of persuasion in roughly the same old way. But rather than go on offering specula-

tions about long-term mutations or localized shifts in the humanities, I should like to step back and take on a more humble, even homely, question: What are the implications of Foucault's work for Rhetoric? Or, to put the question in Foucaultian terms, if our field were to affirm his statements, how would its tactics be transformed and the territory modified? In the pages that follow, I will argue that the way in which we have continued to polarize the terms 'power' and resistance', even as we have taken Foucault into our ranks, forecloses the possibility of our understanding rhetoric's role in social change in a new way.

It is not easy to discern the role Foucault attributes to rhetoric since, other than in his final lectures during which he reportedly dismissed the Sophists by opposing them to the *parrhesiast,* he rarely wrote or spoke about rhetoric per se.[3] However, in a bold and controversial recent essay theoretically grounded in the Foucaultian analysis of the power-knowledge-pleasure complex, Raymie McKerrow affirms in no uncertain terms the place, indeed the centrality, of critical rhetorics and rhetoricians in Foucault's theory of social change. Having extracted from Foucault's work an operational definition of power (power is what power does), he writes: "The task of a critical rhetoric is to undermine and expose the discourse of power in order to thwart its effects in a social relation."[4] On McKerrow's reading of Foucault, social change pivots on the rhetorician's capacity to call into question normative visions:

> The analysis of the discourse of power focuses on the 'normalization' of language intended to maintain the status quo. By producing a description of 'what is,' unfettered by predetermined notions of what 'should be,' the critic is in a position to posit the possibilities of freedom. Recharacterization of the images changes the power relations and recreates a new 'normal' order. In this interaction, 'truth' is that which is supplanted by a newly articulated version that is accepted as a basis for the revised social relations. Once instantiated anew in social relations, the critique continues.[5]

Understood as a force of perpetual critique, the critical rhetorician makes visible to an audience the contingent, and therefore alterable, character of localized tactics of social domination from which their own identifications and identities emerge.

While I agree with McKerrow that something like the critical rhetorician figures in Foucault's account of the process of social transformation, I am somewhat confused by his claim that it is out

of shared knowledge delivered over to the audience by the rhetorician that the collective desire and power to contest forces of domination arises. It seems to me that much of Foucault's work is geared toward uprooting the very notion that it is in knowledge and speech that our liberation hangs in the balance. Indeed, the now infamous critique of the repressive hypothesis may be Foucault's most audacious attempt to interrogate the presumed liberatory potential of knowledge and speech.

To be sure, Foucault's historically grounded rereading of the repressive hypothesis (the hypothesis that power relations bearing on sexuality always take the form of prohibition, censorship, or non-recognition) completely alters the meaning of censorship by seeing in it not a ban on talk about sex but, instead, a mechanism for the production of a virtual explosion of discourses on sexuality. As he puts it: "what is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shadowy existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it *ad infinitum,* while exploiting it as the secret."[6] For Foucault, in other words, censorship as a relation and point of application of power does not reduce people to silence. To the contrary, as Mark Cousins and Althar Hussain put it, the repression of sex "sustains the inquisitiveness about sexual matters, creating an eager audience for yet another revelation about sex and yet another programme for a healthy and liberated sexual life."[7]

What is most striking about Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis from a rhetorical perspective is the fact that once sex is constituted as the "secret" which must be uncovered, the knowledge to which we must gain access, then talk about sexuality is sure to be taken as revelatory and liberating. Power *as* repression or censorship is dangerous therefore not simply because it limits what can be said but, more important, because it incites speakers to believe that the very discourses it has effected are both of their own making and directed against it. As Cousins and Hussain have argued, repression is a mechanism that "determin[es] the form of expression of the repressed material and prompt[s] its repetition."[8] Hence, if we take Foucault's critique of repression seriously and extend its insights to other orders of discourse, we are led to wonder how transgressive, counter-hegemonic or, to borrow McKerrow's term, critical rhetorics can possibly emerge as anything other than one more instantiation of the status quo in a recoded and thus barely recognizable form. To be sure, this is the historico-

philosophical question that McKerrow's essay is always on the brink of asking and never quite willing to answer.

It would be a mistake, I think, to attribute this silence in the essay solely to its author, to read it as the mark of an individual's cognitive failure. For we cannot ignore the simple but significant fact that McKerrow is not the only scholar to have been baffled by the prospect of extracting from Foucault's work an account of the conditions of possibility for resistance and social change. Indeed when Frances Bartkowski writes that "even though he acknowledges quite clearly that 'you can't have one without the other,' Foucault never gives us as committed a look at resistance as we most certainly get at power," she captures in a nutshell a charge that is frequently leveled against Foucault.[9] Yet it seems to me that we go amiss when we move from the observation that Foucault's theory of resistance is not self-evident to the conclusion reached by Bartkowski and others that he lacks one altogether. Indeed, I want to suggest that there is in Foucault's work quite an elaborate theory of resistance, but one that can be grasped only by coming to terms with his decidedly non-monumentalized conception of power.

The Nature of Power

At least since the writing of *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault went to great pains in his books, interviews, and essays to make explicit what had become for him absolutely formative: namely, that a distinction needs to be made between the nature of power relations as such and the concrete discourse/practices of domination operative within specific regimes. Taking as his point of departure the thesis of the 'equivocal nature of power', Foucault came to assert not only, as Etienne Balibar points out, "that there is no longer such a thing as *the* practice of power, but *practices,* each specified by its own 'technology',"[10] he also came to assert that our tendency to understand power only as oppressive is reductive. Explicitly addressing himself to and working against this impoverished, if orthodox, conception of power Foucault wrote in *The History of Sexuality, Volume I:*

> the word *power* is apt to lead to a number of misunderstandings—misunderstandings with respect to its nature, its form, and its unity. By power, I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation

> which, in contrast to violence has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes.[11]

For Foucault, power is something more—or less grandiose—than a dominant ideology or even a hegemonic order that, in standing over and against its subjects, constrains their action and thought. Indeed when he asserts that "relations of power are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment" but, instead "have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play,"[12] Foucault places himself at loggerheads with a great many theorists and critics on the left for whom, as was suggested by *The German Ideology,* power signifies the ruling class's monopoly over the means of mental production.

But what, exactly, does it mean to say that "relations of power are, above all, productive"?[13] In a forthcoming article that seeks to use Foucault's work for post-colonial feminism, Gayatri Spivak provides us with an answer. Taking to heart the Derridean injunction that one must not discount with a flourish a writer's relation to his or her 'mother tongue', she warns that we miss what may be one of Foucault's most enabling insights when we translate *pouvoir* only as *power.* Here I can do no better than to quote her at length:

> It is a pity that there is no word in English corresponding to *pouvoir* as there is "knowing" for *savoir. Pouvoir* is of course "power." But there is also a sense of "can-do"-ness in *pouvoir,* if only because, in its various declinations it is the commonest way of saying "can" in the French language. If "power/knowledge" is seen as the only translation of *pouvoir/savoir,* it monumentalizes Foucault unnecessarily. You know how we use *savoir* in *savoir-faire, savoir-vivre?* Try to get some of that homely verbness into *pouvoir,* and you might come up with something like this: if the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way, then you are able to do only those things with that something which are possible within and by the arrangement of those lines. *Pouvoir/ savoir*—being able to do something—only as you are able to make sense of it.
>
> It is incumbent at this point to bring together a massive set of passages to prove this. I am just going to suggest boldly that, once you get this everyday sense of that couplet in your head, you will see

> Foucault's text resisting the often sanctimonious stock reading pro
> and contra. Power as productive rather than merely repressive re-
> solves itself in a certain way if you don't forget the simple sense of
> *pouvoir/savoir.*[14]

On this reading of Foucault, power names not the imposition of a
limit that constrains human thought and action but a being-able
that is made possible by a grid of intelligibility. Power is a human
calculation performed within and inaugurated by the "lines of mak-
ing sense" that are operative at a particular historical moment or,
as Spivak put it, a "can-do"-ness whose condition of existence is an
orientation in time and space.

To say that practices are made possible by the lines of making
sense is not to suggest that Foucault is implying that practices are
isomorphous to or thoroughly enclosed within the grid. To the
contrary, he claims that, though all practices find their resources in
(and, thus, in this sense are determined by) the arrangement of the
lines within which they are enunciated, they do not operate "under
the sign of a unique necessity."[15] For they carry within themselves
what Foucault calls "a kind of virtual break" out of which a trans-
gression may ensue. It is the break, fissure, or "furrow" that
exists—in effect or essence and not in actual fact or form—within
practice that constitutes the potential "room of concrete freedom,
that is possible transformation."[16] In other words, the "doing" that
is made possible by the arrangement of the lines of making sense
both marks a point of their positive deployment and, in opening up
a virtual space or anticipatory structure, "renders [those lines or
force relations] fragile," "mak[ing] it possible to thwart them."[17]
As Foucault put it in one of his most recent essays that reflects
metacritically on his work: "faced with a relationship of power, a
whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions
may open up."[18]

The Possibility for Resistance

Once we anchor ourselves in this everyday or, as I put it earlier,
non-monumentalized conception of power, Foucault's theory of
resistance (which should not, by the way, be confused with critical
rhetorics per se) comes into focus. Indeed if it is Foucault's argu-
ment that those practices that we take to be quite commonplace,
unremarkable, and unexceptional find their resources in and are

made intelligible by the arrangement of existing lines of sense but carry within themselves a "virtual break" or structure of excess, then three things become clear.

First, what is to be called "resistance" finds its conditions of existence in those virtual breaks or structures of excess opened up by practices performed within the already established lines of making sense that constitute the social weave or social apparatus (*dispositif*).[19] This is crucial not only because it suggests that "the points of resistance" are multiple, heterogeneous, and "distributed in irregular fashion" and, thus, "there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary."[20] It is crucial also because it indicates that resistance cannot be thought as an assault from the outside or an incursion from the fringe. Instead, resistance must be deciphered as "a strategy that is immanent in force relationships," as a practice that works within and against the grain.[21] "Where there is power," Foucault writes, "there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power."[22]

What becomes clear, second, is that those practices that we will call "resistant" are, quite simply or nominalistically speaking, those practices that do not make sense within the available lines of intelligibility or discernment. That is, they do not signify (which is to say, make meaning) because they cannot be referenced within the field. Hence, resistant practices are gestures that defy translation, throw sense off track, and, thus, short-circuit the system through which sense is made. In short, resistance names the nonlegible practices that are performed within the weave but are asymmetrical to it. As Foucault put it, "They are the odd term in relations of power."[23]

What becomes clear, finally, is that subjects who resist, who in doing things that elude sense can only be 'recognized' as the radically Other, must not be understood as the origin proper of transgression. As was noted above, the "virtual" or yet-to-be-materialized break is antecedent to those subjects who, in inhabiting that space, are the means by which resistance obtains the constitution of a practice. As is the case with power, the individual who resists is an effect of force relations, "and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, [the individual] is the element of its articulation."[24] As Michael R. Clifford puts it, the virtuality or the "no-time of the transgressive act entails that transgression cannot be

identified with any *particular* action or activity, and thus cannot be, properly speaking attributed to an agent or originating subject." Instead, he goes on to say,

> the transgressing subject is, in fact an effect of the against-ness (vis-a-vis the limit) of the transgressive act, a shadow caused by and discernable in the lightning flash of transgression. Thus, the act of transgression can be said to be prior to the transgressing subject.[25]

But in defining the transgressing subject or subject of resistance as an effect-structure or, to use more familiar Foucaultian terms, a subject postion whose condition of possibility is always already "inscribed" within the field (which is to say written there without intention), Foucault is not advancing in disguised form an Althusserian functionalism which posits resistance as the always already duped performance of an interpellated actor whose role is prescribed by a script that is determining in the first instance rather than in "the last."

Style as Resistance

Foucault's most recent discussions of the "stylized practices of the self" or "aesthetics of existence" may be read as a concerted effort on his part to specify the place and function of the deliberate intending subject whose acts, though made possible by the social apparatus or field, cannot be reduced to the mere playing out of a code. Commenting on this area of inquiry that would preoccupy him up to the moment of his untimely death he states:

> It seems to me that in *Madness and Civilization, The Order of Things,* and also *Discipline and Punish* a lot of things which were implicit could not be rendered explicit due to the manner in which I posed the problems. I tried to locate three major types of problems: the problem of truth, the problem of power, and the problem of individual conduct. These three domains of experience can only be understood in relation to each other, not independently. What bothered me about the previous books is that I considered the first two experiences without taking the third into account.[26]

As is well known, Foucault's turn toward "the problem of individual conduct" leads him to an examination of the "arts of existence" or, as he explains in *The Use of Pleasure,*

> those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.[27]

It is important that "arts of existence" or "techniques of the self" constitute for Foucault the substantive practice of freedom (which always already takes the form of resistance). It is "through a struggle with a stylizing or adaptation of those concrete possibilities which present themselves as invitations for a practice of liberty," James Bernauer succinctly states, that a self "becomes autonomous."[28] Such a project leads one, no doubt, down a perilous and uncertain path, not only because it entails "the refusal of [the] kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries" but also because it demands that one invent, not discover, who one is, thereby "promoting new forms of subjectivity."[29] Addressing the difficulties one encounters when attempting to "make a work of art of one's life" in that "virtual" space, Foucault provides the following example:

> Between a man and a younger woman the marriage institution makes it easier; she accepts it and makes it work. But two men of noticeably different ages—what code would allow them to communicate? They face each other without terms or convenient words, with nothing to assure them about the meaning of the movement that carries them towards each other. They have to invent, from A to Z, a relationship that is still formless, which is friendship."[30]

Operating in an uncharted region, a space in which the old rules for making sense do not apply, the self must forge "a manner of being that is still improbable."[31]

It should be emphasized here that Foucault's turn toward "the problem of individual conduct" or "stylized practices" of the self does not signify a return to a humanism that posits the intending subject as origin, center, end, reference, evidence, and arbiter of theory and practice. As was the case in his early and middle works, Foucault remains committed to the position that "nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men."[32] Thus, the attempt to specify "the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject" marks a shift in emphasis rather than a change of

heart.[33] That is to say, in his later work Foucault continues to insist on the notion that subjectivity is an effect (a position made available by rather than existing outside of or prior to force relations and representation) even as he struggles to show that those subject positions "are of course not filled in the same way by different individuals."[34] Reflecting on this latter phase of the project, Foucault states:

> I would say that if now I am interested in fact, in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion by the practices of self, these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his social group.[35]

Perhaps the most concrete and exacting description of the "stylization" or "fashioning" of a self comes to us in Foucault's reading of the journals of Herculine Barbin, a hermaphrodite for whom participation in homosexual exchange constituted the "happy limbo of a non-identity" that was at once "obligatory and forbidden."[36] What is important to notice in this case study is, as Judith Butler notes,

> Herculine's anatomy does not fall outside the categories of sex, but confuses and redistributes the constitutive elements of those categories; indeed, the free play of attributes has the effect of exposing the illusory character of sex as an abiding substantive substrate to which these carious attributes are presumed to adhere. Moreover, Herculine's sexuality constitutes a set of gender transgressions which challenge the very distinction between heterosexual and lesbian erotic exchange, underscoring the points of the ambiguous convergence and redistribution.[37]

Taking up the virtual space whose condition of existence is an eroticized taboo, Herculine articulates homoerotic pleasures that challenge the positivity of heretofore established points of reference and, likewise, orthodox lines of making sense. It is precisely at moments like this one that the stage is set for the emergence of critical rhetorics.

Critical Rhetorics

If this long discussion has indeed captured Foucault's theory of resistance, it becomes clear that critical rhetoricians and their dis-

courses do not set practices of resistance into motion but, rather, are themselves set into motion by those practices. That is to say, rather than being originary in the sense that, as McKerrow put it, their words "contain the seeds of subversion or rejection of authority,"[38] critical rhetoricians are, like all others, selves "called into being by the totality of these practices, the concept which they need in order to be able to link themselves together."[39] This is not to say, however, that in having "deprived the sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to [discursive change]" there is for Foucault no crucial role for critical rhetoricians to play.[40] Quite the contrary, operating at the level of publics but in a fashion analogous to that of the "specific intellectual," the critical rhetorician's task is to "make these virtualities visible" by the strategic and deliberate codification of those points of resistance. In other words, the task is to trace new lines of making sense by taking hold of the sign whose reference had been destabilized by and through those practices of resistance, lines that cut diagonally across and, thus disrupt, the social weave. As Foucault put it in a passage that I feel obliged to cite at length,

> [Resistances] are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior. Are there no great radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their body and minds. Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the swarm of points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities. And it is doubtless the strategic codification of those points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships.[41]

We might say, then, that a critical rhetoric is a timely discourse whose task is not, as we have heretofore thought, one of "changing what's in people's heads." Instead, it is about turning the grid of intelligibility that organizes the present in such a way that it becomes possible "to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of

a possible transgression" out of which "new forms of community, co-existence, pleasure" will emerge.[42]

Conclusion

Less than one year before his death, Michel Foucault told us that "nothing hides the fact of a problem in common better than two similar ways of approaching it."[43] To be sure, throughout his career, Foucault had an uncanny capacity to approach things differently, to enact what Kenneth Burke has called a "perspective by incongruity"—not in order to distinguish himself from others working in the field but in order to keep his own intellect alive. As he put it so eloquently in *The Uses of Pleasure,* "there are times in one's life when the question as to whether one can think otherwise than one does is indispensable if one is to go on looking and reflecting." So far in this essay I have tried to argue that Foucault presents us with an alternative way to understand the condition of possibility and function of critical rhetorics, one that would surely alter our tactics of analysis without crushing our conviction that the world can be otherwise. I would like to end by floating one plausible answer to the other half of the question posed at the opening of the essay, that is, How would Rhetoric's territory be modified in the event that we affirm his statements?

It seems to me that if rhetorical theorists and critics were to follow the current of Foucault's inquiry into "the aesthetics of existence," we would find ourselves in a position to reinvent our relationship to style. To be sure, within the discipline of Rhetoric, lines of making sense have been historically laid down in such a way that it became possible for us to craft our identity in relation to Philosophy, languages and literatures, Sociology, and History. At some point, in the midst of our weaving a disciplinary self, style was situated on the bias.[44] It became the "odd term in our relations of power," that part of ourselves that was constituted as non-sense, as insignificant—as that which lures but does not teach, delights but does not move.

But if there is no truth to be found in those "pearls of rhetoric" about which Cicero asked us not to inquire, perhaps there is pleasure. And it is pleasure, the power of pleasure to incite ourselves and others to action, that Rhetoric has yet to explore. Perhaps this is Foucault's legacy and may be our tribute.

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Notes

1. Isaac D. Balbus, "Disciplining Women: Michel Foucault and the Power of Feminist Discourse," in *After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges,* ed. Jonathan Arac (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 145.

2. James W. Bernauer, "Beyond life and death: On Foucault's post-Auschwitz ethic," in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher,* trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), 261.

3. Reporting on Foucault's 1984 lectures, Thomas Flynn writes, "The parrhesiast in fourth-century Greece has to meet certain prior conditions. Of course, he had to speak the truth, but this truth could not be merely a *de facto* verity, a mere coincidence of speech with fact. He had to really believe it himself and to manifest that belief. Moreover, in speaking the truth, the parrhesiast had to run a personal risk before the other to whom he spoke. There was risk of violence at the hand of the inter-locutor. . . . The rhetorician, in Foucault's view, was the open contrary of the parrhesiast. He did not have to meet these prior conditions to enter into discourse. For example, he did not have to believe what he said. The characteristic link in his case was not with what he said but with the audience to whom he said it. Moreover, unlike the parrhesiast, he was a professional in classical society with a metier of his own" ("Foucault as parrhesiast: his last course at the college de france," in *The Final Foucault,* eds. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen [Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1988], 103). Foucault does, for example, examine the work of Isocrates in *The Uses of Pleasure* (trans. Robert Hurley [New York: Vintage Books, 1986]) and does mention rhetoric in his seminar "Technologies of the Self" (eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick Hutton, *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* [Amherst MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988]) but only to move on to other concerns. For example, Foucault says of rhetoric in "Technologies of the Self": "In traditional political life, oral culture was largely dominant, and therefore rhetoric was important. But the development of the administrative structures and the bureaucracy of the imperial period increased the amount and role of writing in the political sphere. In Plato's writings, dialogue gave way to the literary pseudodialogue. But by the Hellenistic age, writing prevailed, and real dialectic passed to correspondence. Taking care of oneself became linked to constant writing activity" (27).

4. Raymie E. McKerrow, "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis," *Communication Monographs* 56 (1989): 98.

5. McKerrow, 100.

6. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction,* trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 35.

7. Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, *Michel Foucault* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 207.

8. Cousins and Hussain, 208.

9. Francis Bartkowski, "Epistemic Drift in Foucault," *Feminism and Foucault: Reflections and Resistance,* eds. Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), 44.

10. Etienne Balibar, "Foucault and Marx: The question of nominalism," in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher,* 45.

11. Foucault, *History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 92.

12. Foucault, *History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 94.

13. Michel Foucault, "The End of the Monarchy of Sex," in *Foucault Live: Interviews, 1966–84,* trans. John Johnston, ed. Sylvere Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 1947.

14. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Michel Foucault" [working title], in *Rethinking Power,* ed. Thomas E. Wartenberg (New York: SUNY Press), forthcoming.

15. Michel Foucault, *L'Impossible Prison: Recherches sur le système penitentiare au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 46.

16. Michel Foucault, "How Much Does It Cost For Reason To Tell The Truth," *Foucault Live,* 252.

17. Foucault, *History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 101.

18. Michel Foucault, "Afterword: The Subject of Power," in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,* ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 220. Emphasis added.

19. For an analysis of Foucault's use of the *dispositif* that takes Foucault's nominalism seriously, see Gilles Deleuze, "What *is* a dispositif?" in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher,* 159–66.

20. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 96; 95–96.

21. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 97. It should be emphasized here that resistance, the condition of possiblity of which is the "virtual" break, is not a mode of being that can be understood as articulating a future-present. To the contrary, resistance is never there but always there. In short, it is simply not within the calculus of power/knowledge (pouvoir/savoir).

22. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 95.

23. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 96.

24. Michel Foucault, "Lecture One: 7 January 1976," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977,* ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 98.

25. Michael R. Clifford, "Crossing (Out) the Boundary: Foucault and Derrida on Transgressing Transgression," *Philosophy Today* 31 (1987): 226.

26. Michel Foucault, "Final Interview," *Raritan* VI (Summer 1985): 2.

27. Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume II,* trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 16.

28. Bernauer, 70–71.

29. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 216. See also Lawrence D. Kritzman's essay "Michel Foucault and the Ethics of Sexuality" (*L'Espirt Createur* XXV [Summer 1985]) wherein he notes that "the question of style, through a method analogous to that of rhetorical invention, permitted one to constitute oneself as an artifact" (88).

30. Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure,* 16; Michel Foucault, "Friendship as a Way of Life," in *Foucault Live,* 204–205.

31. Foucault, "Friendship as a Way of Life," 206.

32. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected essays and interviews,* ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 153.

33. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 208.

34. Gayatri Spivak, *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Methuen, 1987), 304.

34. Michel Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An interview with Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984," in *The Final Foucault,* 11.

36. Michel Foucault, ed., *Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century Hermaphrodite,* trans. Richard McDongall (New York: Colophon, 1980).

37. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 100–101.

38. McKerrow, 108.

39. Francois Wahl, "Inside or Outside Philosophy," in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher,* 70.

40. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 209.

41. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I,* 96.

42. Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader,* ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 45.

43. Michel Foucault, "Interview: The Minimalist Self," in *Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture,* ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 26.

44. For a history of this movement see: Tzvetan Todorov, *Theories of the Symbol,* trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1977).