THE

PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC

AND THEIR APPLICATION

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WITH AN APPENDIX

COMPRISING GENERAL RULES FOR PUNCTUATION

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INTRODUCTION.

For the purposes of this treatise, Rhetoric may be defined as the art of efficient communication by language. It is not one of several arts out of which a choice may be made; it is *the* art to the principles of which, consciously or unconsciously, a good writer or speaker must conform.

It is an *art*, not a science: for it neither observes, nor discovers, nor classifies; but it shows how to convey from one mind to another the results of observation, discovery, or classification; it uses knowledge, not as knowledge, but as power.

Logic simply teaches the right use of reason, and may be practised by the solitary inhabitant of a desert island; but Rhetoric, being the art of *communication* by language, implies the presence, in fact or in imagination, of at least two persons, — the speaker or the writer, and the person spoken to or written to. Aristotle makes the very essence of Rhetoric to lie in the distinct recognition of a hearer. Hence, its rules are not absolute, like those of logic, but relative to the character and

circumstances of those addressed; for though truth is one, and correct reasoning must always be correct, the ways of communicating truth are many.

Being the art of communication by *language*, Rhetoric applies to any subject-matter that can be treated in words, but has no subject-matter peculiar to itself. It does not undertake to furnish a person with something to say; but it does undertake to tell him how best to say that with which he has provided himself. "Style," says Coleridge, "is the art of conveying the meaning appropriately and with perspicuity, whatever that meaning may be;" but some meaning there must be: for, "in order to form a good style, the primary rule and condition is, not to attempt to express ourselves in language before we thoroughly know our own meaning."

Part I. of this treatise discusses and illustrates the general principles which apply to written or spoken discourse of every kind. Part II. deals with those principles which apply, exclusively or especially, to Narrative or to Argumentative Composition, — the two kinds of prose writing which seem to require separate treatment.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.

PART I.

COMPOSITION IN GENERAL.

BOOK I.

GRAMMATICAL PURITY.

CHAPTER I.

GOOD USE.

GRAMMAR, in the widest sense of the word, though readily distinguishable from Rhetoric, is its basis. He who has mastered the mechanics of language has a great advantage over one who cannot express himself correctly, as a painter whose pencil rarely errs has a great advantage over one who cannot draw correctly. To know the proper use of one's native tongue is no merit; not to know it is a positive demerit, — a demerit the greater in the case of one who has enjoyed the advantages of education. Yet, not even eminent speakers or writers, not even those who readily detect similar faults in others, are themselves free from errors in grammar, — such, at least, as may be committed, through inadvertence, in the hurry of speech or of composition. "A distinguished British scholar of the last century said he had known but three of his countrymen who spoke their native language with uniform

Importance of correct expression.

grammatical accuracy; and the observation of most persons widely acquainted with English and American society confirms the general truth implied in this declaration."[1] "It makes us blush to add," says De Quincey,[2] "that even grammar is so little of a perfect attainment amongst us, that, with two or three exceptions (one being Shakspere, whom some affect to consider as belonging to a semi-barbarous age), we have never seen the writer, through a circuit of prodigious reading,[3] who has not sometimes violated the accidence or the syntax[4] of English grammar."

Correctness (or Purity) is, then, the first requisite of discourse, whether spoken or written. Whatever is addressed to English-speaking people should be in the English tongue. With a few exceptions, to be hereafter noted,[5] it should (1) contain none but English words, phrases, and idioms; (2) these words, phrases, and idioms should be combined according to the English fashion; and (3) they should be used in the English meaning.

Grammatical purity defined.

What, now, determines whether a given expression is English?

Evidently, the answer to this question is not to be sought in inquiries concerning the origin, the history, or the fundamental characteristics of the language. However interesting in themselves, however successfully prosecuted, such investigations are foreign to a study which has to do, not with words as they have been, or might have been, or may be, but with words as they are; not with the English of yes-

False tests of good English.

[1] George P. Marsh: Lectures on the English Language, lect. v.

[2] Essay on Style.

[3] Query as to the position of this clause; see p. 140.

[4] See p. 34 for an example taken from this very essay.

[5] See pp. 10, 61.

terday or to-morrow, still less with a theorist's ideal English, but with the English of to-day.

In the English of to-day, one word is not preferred to another because it is derived from this or from that source; the present meaning of a word is not fixed by its etymology, nor its inflection by the inflection of other words with which it is commonly classed, nor its spelling by what some writers are pleased to call "reason."

Arithmetic (from the Greek), *flour* (from the Latin), *mutton* (from the French), *gas* (a term invented by a chemist [1]), are as good words as *sheep*, *meal*, or *fire*. In its proper place, *manufacture* is as good as *handiwork*, *purple* as *red*, *prairie* as *meadow*, *magnificent* as *great*, *murmur* as *buzz*, *have* as *be*, *oval* as *egg*, *convention* as *meeting*.

Though a vast majority of nouns form the plural in *s*, the plural of *ox* is still *oxen*, and that of *mouse* is still *mice;* though we may no longer say that "a bee *stang* John," we may say that "the bells *rang;*" though *its* has been used only three centuries, it is as much a part of the language as *his* and *her*, and one can only smile at a recent writer's hostility to this "unlucky, new-fangled word." [2]

"There is," says Landor, "a fastidiousness in the use of language that indicates an atrophy of mind. We must take words as the world presents them to us, without looking at the root. If we grubbed under this and laid it bare, we should leave no room for our thoughts to lie evenly, and every expression would be constrained and crampt.[3] We should scarcely find a metaphor in the purest author that is not false or imperfect, nor could we imagine one ourselves that would not be stiff and frigid. Take now, for instance, a phrase in common use. *You are rather late.* Can any thing seem plainer? Yet *rather*, as you know, meant

[1] Van Helmont, a Fleming (born in 1577).

[2] T. L. Kington Oliphant: The Sources of Standard English, p. 309. (1873.)

[3] A spelling peculiar to Landor among modern prose writers. *Cramped* is the proper form.

originally *earlier*, being the comparative of *rathe:* the 'rathe primrose' of the poet recalls it. We cannot say, *You are sooner late;* but who is so troublesome and silly as to question the propriety of saying, *You are rather late?* We likewise say, *bad orthography* and *false orthography:* how can there be false or bad *right-spelling?*"[1]

The fastidiousness that objects to well-established words because their appearance "proclaims their vile and despicable origin;"[2] or to well-understood phrases, because they "contain some word that is never used except as a part of the phrase;"[2] or to idiomatic expressions, because, "when analyzed grammatically, they include a solecism,"[2] or because they were "originally the spawn, partly of ignorance, and partly of affectation,"[2] — the fastidiousness, in short, that would sacrifice to the proprieties of language the very expressions that give life to our daily speech and vigor to the best writing, deserves no gentler treatment than Landor gives the etymologists.

Pell-mell, topsy-turvy, helter-skelter, hurly-burly, hocus-pocus, hodge-podge, harum-scarum, namby-pamby, willy-nilly, shilly-shally, higgledy-piggledy, dilly-dally, hurry-scurry, carry their meaning instantaneously to every mind.[3]

Though the italicized words in "by *dint* of," "as *lief*," "to and *fro*," "not a *whit*," "*kith* and kin," "might and *main*," "*hue* and cry," "*pro* and *con*," "*spick* and *span* new," are unused except in the phrases quoted, the phrases are universally understood, and there is no more reason for challenging the words composing them than there is for challenging a syllable in a word.

[1] Walter Savage Landor: Works, vol. iv. p. 165.

[2] George Campbell: The Philosophy of Rhetoric, book ii. chap. ii. (1750.)

[3] See Irving's "Legend of Sleepy Hollow," Browning's "Hervé Riel," and various passages in Burke.

Would God, whether or no, never so good, whereabouts, many a, to dance attendance, to scrape acquaintance, whether easy to parse or not, are easy to understand, are facts in language. *Currying favor* may at once defy grammatical analysis and smell of the stable; but what other expression sums up the low arts by which a toady seeks to ingratiate himself?

The only sound principle.

In the use of language, there is only one sound principle of judgment. If to be understood is, as it should be, a writer's first object, his language must be such as his readers understand, and understand as he understands it. If, being a scholar, he uses Latinisms or Gallicisms known only to scholars like himself; if, being a physician or a lawyer, he uses legal or medical cant; or if, living in Yorkshire or in Arkansas, he writes in the dialect of Yorkshire or in that of Arkansas;—his work, even if not partially unintelligible, will be distasteful to the general public. If he is so fond of antiquity as to prefer a word that has not been in good use since the twelfth or the seventeenth century to one only fifty years old but in good use to-day, he is in danger of being shelved with his adopted contemporaries; if, on the other hand, he is so greedy of novelty as to snatch at the words of a season, of which few survive the occasion that gave them birth, his work is likely to be as ephemeral as they. By avoiding vulgarity and pedantry alike, a writer, while commending himself to the best class of readers, loses nothing in the estimation of others; for those who do not speak or write pure English themselves understand it when spoken or written by others, but rarely understand more than one variety of impure English.

The reasons, in short, which prevent an English author from publishing a treatise in Greek, Celtic, or

French, or in a dialect peculiar to a place or a class, prohibit him from employing any expression not familiar to the great body of cultivated men in English-speaking countries, and not sanctioned by *good use*, — that is, by *reputable*, *national*, and *present* use: reputable as opposed to vulgar or affected; national as opposed to foreign, local, or professional; present as opposed to obsolete or transient.

Good use defined.

Reputable use is fixed, not by the practice of those whom A or B deems the best speakers or writers, but by that of those whom the world deems the best, — not the little world in which A or B moves, but the world of intelligent people, — those who are in the best repute, not indeed as to thought, but as to *expression*, the manner of communicating thought. The practice of no one writer, however high he may stand in the public estimation, is enough to settle a point; but the uniform, or nearly uniform, practice of reputable speakers or writers is decisive. Their aim being fully and promptly to communicate what they have to say, they use the language best adapted to that purpose; and their use, in its turn, helps to fix the forms they adopt.

Reputable use.

Among common expressions that are not in reputable use are the following: *on tick; with vim; neck-handkerchief* ("neckerchief"); *swingeing* (as in "a swingeing bill"); *I allow* ("maintain"); *I reckon*, *calculate*, *guess*, or *fancy* (when used to express opinion, expectation, or intention); *shaky; no great shakes* ("of little account"); *bogus; a new dodge; to qualify* (in the sense of "to take an oath of office"); *to wire* or *to cable* ("to telegraph"); *to skedaddle*.

These are specimens of large classes of expressions that, whether in more or less general use, whether met in all circles but the highest, in all parts of England or of America, or only in one place or one circle, are far from being reputable.

National use is fixed by speakers and writers of national reputation. That reputation they could not enjoy, if they were readily understood by the people of only one district or the members of only one class. Using language intelligible in every district and to every class, they serve to keep the common fund of expression in general circulation. Even in matters of pronunciation and accent, the standard, though difficult to find, can be found in the concurrent practice of the most approved poets and public speakers and of the most cultivated social circles. National use.

Among provincialisms that should be avoided are the following: The pronunciation of "news" as *nooz;* of "were" and "weren't" as *waur* and *waurn't*, or *wair* and *wairn't;* of "sewing" as *sueing;* of "neighbor" as *neebor;* of "chamber" as *chămber.* The use of *shew* for "showed;" *proven* for "proved;" *india-rubbers* or *gums* for "over-shoes;" *vest* for "waistcoat;" *slice* (current in some parts of England and in south-eastern Massachusetts) for "fire-shovel;" *folks* for "people" or "family;" *flit, flitting,* for "move" or "remove," and "moving" or "removing;" *yon* for "that;" *to hail from,* in the sense of "to report as one's home;" *part* for "region" (as "Switzerland is a mountainous part"); *this* for "this place;" *in this connection* for "in connection with this subject;" "I'll be back *to rights*" for "presently;" *right off, right away,* for "immediately;" "it rains *right* (for "very") hard;" *right here* (for "at this point"); *a smart sprinkle, a smart chance, a smart boy,* for "a heavy shower," "a good chance," "a bright boy;" *bully* or *crack* for "excellent;" *bummers* for "camp-followers;" *fetch up* for "bring up" (as a child); "I should *admire* (for "like") to see;" *to stop* for "to stay;" *ilk* for "same," — as "Bradwardine of that ilk,"[1] meaning "Bradwardine of Bradwardine," — or for "kind," as "Tyler and others of that ilk;" *disremember; boughten* (as distinguished from "home-made"); *lumber* for "timber;" *The States* for "The United States;" *elective* or *optional* (for "elective," or "optional, studies").

[1] Scott: Waverley, vol. ii. chap. xiv.

Instances of expressions that have come from professional into more or less general, but not into good, use are the following: From the law, *aforesaid* or *said* (as "the said man"), *on the docket*, *entail* (in the sense of "bring"), "*and now* comes" (at the beginning of a paragraph), *I claim* (in the sense of "maintain") *that;* from the pulpit, *on the anxious seat*, *phylactery*, *advent*, *hierarchy*, *neophyte;* from medicine, *affection* (as "an *affection* of the liver"); from commerce, *balance* (as "the *balance* of the day was given to talk"), "in his *line*," *A No. 1;* from the Congressional dialect, *to champion* ("support") a measure, *to antagonize*, — two measures contending for precedence in the order of legislation are said *to antagonize* each other, a senator is said *to antagonize* ("oppose") a bill or another senator; from mathematics, *to differentiate* (in the sense of "to make a difference between"); from a school in political economy, *wage* and *wage-fund* ("wages, wages-fund"), *to appreciate* and *to depreciate* (in the sense of "to rise," or "to fall, in value"); from the stock-market, *to aggregate* (in the sense of "to amount to," as "the sales *aggregated*[1] fifty thousand shares"), *to take stock in*, *above par;* from mining, *to pan out*, *hard pan*, *to get down to bed rock*, *to strike a bonanza* or *to strike oil* (in the sense of "to succeed"), *these diggings* ("this section").

The following are instances of foreign expressions to which English equivalents are preferable: *née* ("Casaubon *born* Brooke"[1] is preferable), on the *tapis* (carpet), *coup de soleil* (sunstroke), *trottoir* (sidewalk), *motif* (motive), *morceau* (piece), *émeute* (riot), *fracas* (brawl), *abattoir* (slaughter-house), *feux d'artifice* (fireworks), *dépôt* (station), *gamin* (street boy, street Arab), *chevalier d'industrie* (adventurer), *bas bleu* (blue-stocking), *derailment* (said of a train thrown off the track).[2]

Words in good use in the United States are to be preferred by an American to those not heard out of Great Britain: as *coal* to *coals*, *pitcher* to *jug*, *honor* to *honour*, railroad *cars* to *carriages*, *horse railroad* to *tramway*, *trunks* to *boxes*, *wharves* to *wharfs*. An Englishman, on the other hand, should, as matter of national use, prefer the English to the American form.

Present use is determined neither by authors who wrote so long ago that their diction has become antiquated, nor by those whose national reputation is not

[1] See also p. 60. [2] George Eliot: Middlemarch.

[2] See, for other examples, p. 22.

firmly established. Not even the authority of Shakspere, of Milton, or of Johnson, though supported by the uniform practice of his contemporaries, justifies an expression that has been disused for fifty years; nor does the adoption by many newspapers of a new word, or of an old word in a new sense, establish it in the language. In both cases, time is the court of last resort; and the decisions of this court are made known by recent writers of national reputation.

Present use.

The exact boundaries of present use cannot, however, be fixed with precision. Dr. Campbell, writing in the last century, held that no word should be deemed in present use which was not to be found in works written since 1688, or which was found only in the works of living authors; but in these days of change, words come and go more rapidly. New things call for new names; and the new names, if generally accepted, will, in a few years, come with the new things into present use. The history of gas, steam, mining, of the railroad, of the telegraph, abounds in familiar instances. When, on the other hand, the study of mental and moral philosophy received, in the early part of the century, an impulse from Germany, words long disused were recalled to life.

Its boundaries.

"*Reason* and *understanding*, as words denominative of distinct faculties; the adjectives *sensuous*, *transcendental*, *subjective* and *objective*, *supernatural*, as an appellation of the spiritual, or that immaterial essence which is not subject to the law of cause and effect, and is thus distinguished from that which is *natural*, — are all words revived, not invented, by the school of Coleridge."[1]

Again: words may be in present use in poetry which are obsolete, or almost obsolete, in prose.

[1] Marsh: English Language, lect. viii.

Examples in point are: *ere*, *anon*, *mount*, *vale*, *nigh*, *save* (for "except"), *betwixt*, *hight*, *scarce* and *exceeding* (for "scarcely" and "exceedingly"), *erst*, *whilom*, *mine* (as in "mine host"), *ire*, *withal*, *hath*, *yclept*, *yore*, *quoth*, *kine*, *don*, *doff*, *nay* and *yea*, *whilst*.

Byron can sing of "the *Isles* of Greece," but an historian would speak of "islands." Tennyson can say *rampire* and *shoon* where prose would write "rampart" and "shoes," just as he can call the sky "the breezy blue."[1]

So, too, words are obsolete for one kind of prose, but not for another. An historical novel, for example, may indulge in expressions, now obsolete, that are characteristic of the time in which the scene is laid; but care should be taken not to make such expressions so numerous as to render the work unintelligible to ordinary readers. All that can be done is to suggest antiquity. In Thackeray's "Henry Esmond," for example, *'tis* for *it is* (a peculiarity of "The Spectator," but rare in modern prose[1a]) goes far to take the reader back to Queen Anne's time.

In all cases, "the question is not, whether a diction is antiquated for current speech, but whether it is antiquated for that particular purpose for which it is employed. A diction that is antiquated for common speech and common prose, may very well not be antiquated for poetry or certain special kinds of prose. 'Peradventure there shall be ten found there,' is not antiquated for Biblical prose, though for conversation or for a newspaper it is antiquated. 'The trumpet spake not to the armèd throng' is not antiquated for poetry, although we should not write in a letter, 'he spake to me,' or say, 'the British soldier is armèd with the Enfield rifle.'"[2]

These principles taken for granted, it follows that grammarians and lexicographers have no authority not derived from good use. Their business is to record in a

[1] p. 79.

[1a] Used frequently, however, by R. W. Emerson.

[2] Matthew Arnold: Essays in Criticism, p. 385.

convenient form the decision of every case in which recent writers or speakers of national reputation are agreed; but they have no more right to call in question such a decision than the compiler of a digest has to overrule a legislature or a court.

Analogy between law and language.

When, however, usage is divided, when each of two forms of expression is almost equally supported by authority, there is room for argument, as there is when legal precedents conflict. In the latter case, the question is looked at in the light of the general principles of law; in the former case, the question may be looked at in the light of the general principles of language: in both cases, a critic's conclusion is an expression of personal opinion, not an authoritative decision. It binds nobody, and it is frequently overruled.

CHAPTER IV.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.

The four requisites of good composition.

THUS we have seen that to the efficiency of communication by language four things are necessary: Grammatical Purity (or Correctness), — the use of those expressions, and those only, which are accepted by the consentient practice of the speakers or writers of the present time who enjoy the best national reputation; Clearness (or Perspicuity), — the quality in style by which the meaning is conveyed to the person addressed, in appropriate words, as few as are compatible with completeness of statement, and arranged as nearly in the order of the thought as the language permits; Force, — the quality that selects the most effective expressions and arranges them in the most effective manner; and Elegance (or Beauty), — conformity to good taste.

While engaged in the act of composition, a writer should think little about Force, and not at all about positive Elegance; but he should constantly aim to make himself intelligible, sure that if he does not succeed in doing this, other merits will be of little avail, and that if he does succeed, other merits will be likely to come unsought. To this end, he should obtain as extensive a command of language as possible.

"When discoursing in public, let your choice of words be neither tainted with indelicacy, nor tarnished with affectation. Let your word bear the express image of your thought, and transmit it com-

plete to your hearer's mind. You need then give yourself very little concern to inquire for the parish register of its nativity. Whether new or old, whether of Saxon or of Grecian parentage, it will perform its duties to your satisfaction, without at all impairing your reputation for purity of speech."[1]

He should seek to conform to Swift's definition of a good style: "Proper words in proper places;" and to the rules by which "any one," as Locke says, "may preserve himself from the confines and suspicion of jargon": —

"My lord, the new way of ideas, and the old way of speaking intelligibly, was always, and ever will be, the same. And if I may take the liberty to declare my sense of it, herein it consists: (1) That a man use no words but such as he makes the signs of certain determined objects of his mind in thinking, which he can make known to another. (2) Next that he use the same word steadily for the sign of the same immediate object of his mind in thinking. (3) That he join those words together in propositions, according to the grammatical rules of that language he speaks in. (4) That he unite those sentences in a coherent discourse."[2]

The question remains whether, under the general considerations that have been suggested and the rules that have been laid down, any fundamental principle exists.

Herbert Spencer maintains that such a principle is to be found in what he calls "economy of attention." He thinks that the sufficient reason for choosing the best words for the purpose in hand and arranging them in the best order is, that the reader's attention, being thus subjected to the least possible strain from the machinery of language, can be more closely given to the thought; that, therefore, the best

Spencer's theory.

[1] J. Q. Adams: Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, lect. xxv. p. 159.

[2] Locke: Works, vol. iv. p. 430; Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester.

writer is he who, other things being equal, draws least upon a reader's mental powers and sensibilities.

Its insufficiency.

This theory is very well as far as it goes; but it does not lay sufficient stress upon the fact that a reader's mental power is not a constant quantity; that, therefore, a writer who increases this power by stimulating mental action arrives, by a different road, at the same destination which is reached by another writer who by a wise economy prevents unnecessary waste. The superiority of the metaphor to the simile,[1] and of a suggestive to an "exhaustive" style,[2] lies, as has been shown, in each case — partly, at least — in the stimulating power of the former; and the same may be said of the superiority of "words that burn" over those of the cold understanding, and of an orderly over a loose arrangement.

The greatest genius of all is, of course, he who economizes a reader's attention at the same time that he stimulates his energies: Dante, for instance, "whose verse holds itself erect by the mere force of the substantive and verb, without the help of a single epithet," [3] but who "knew how to spend as well as to spare. . . . His simile of the doves (Inferno, v. 82 *et seq.*), perhaps the most exquisite in all poetry, quite oversteps Rivarol's narrow limit of substantive and verb." [4]

Unity with Variety.

Another principle which underlies all rhetorical rules is (as has been hinted more than once in the foregoing pages[5]) the principle of all art, — the principle of Unity in design conjoined with manifold Variety in methods.

[1] See p. 91. [2] See pp. 125, 127.

[3] Rivarol, quoted by J. R. Lowell: Among my Books (Second Series), p. 38.

[4] Lowell: Ibid., p. 40.

[5] See pp. 111, 157, 159. See also p. 186

"A great author is not one who merely has a *copia verborum*, whether in prose or verse, and can, as it were, turn on at his will any number of splendid phrases and swelling sentences; but he is one who has something to say and knows how to say it. . . . He writes passionately, because he feels keenly; forcibly, because he conceives vividly; he sees too clearly to be vague; he is too serious to be otiose; he can analyze his subject, and therefore he is rich; he embraces it as a whole and in its parts, and therefore he is consistent; he has a firm hold of it, and therefore he is luminous. When his imagination wells up, it overflows in ornament; when his heart is touched, it thrills along his verse. He always has the right word for the right idea, and never a word too much. If he is brief, it is because few words suffice; if he is lavish of them, still each word has its mark, and aids, not embarrasses, the vigorous march of his elocution."[1]

Not that a writer should aim to be the "perfectly endowed man" of whom Herbert Spencer[2] dreams. "To be specific in style," says Spencer, "is to be poor in speech;" but to be in no sense and in no degree "specific in style" is to be "faultily faultless," to be devoid of that individuality which is at once the spring and the charm of genius. Emerson teaches a sounder doctrine in giving the "essential caution to young writers that they shall not in their discourse leave out the one thing which the discourse was written to say," but shall each "obey" his "native bias." "To each his own method, style, wit, eloquence."[3]

"In each rank of fruits, as in each rank of masters, one is endowed with one virtue, and another with another; their glory is their dissimilarity, and they who propose to themselves in the training of an artist that he should unite the coloring of Tintoret, the finish of Albert Durer, and the tenderness of Correggio, are no wiser than a horticulturist would be, who made it the object of his

[1] J. H. Newman: Lectures on University Subjects, p. 62.
[2] Philosophy of Style.
[3] Letters and Social Aims, pp. 274–277; Greatness.

labor to produce a fruit which should unite in itself the lusciousness of the grape, the crispness of the nut, and the fragrance of the pine."[1]

Shakspere most nearly approaches Spencer's ideal, because he speaks through many voices; but even in him, when he ceases to be Iago or Juliet, "a specific style" can be traced. The fact, however, that his individuality so often eludes discovery renders him to many persons a book rather than a man.

The Unity which every writer should seek is not the unity of perfection, but is that which comes from the conception of a discourse as a whole, and from the harmonious arrangement of the parts in conformity with that conception: the only Variety which can be of avail is that which naturally presents itself. A composition should be "a body, not a mere collection of members,"[2] but it should be a *living* body. Its life must come, partly from the natural qualities of the writer, and partly from his acquired resources, whether of matter or of language — resources which it is not the province of Rhetoric to supply.

[1] Ruskin: Modern Painters, vol. iii. part iv. p. 43 (American Edition).
[2] Quintilian: Inst. Orator. vii. x. xvii.